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Abstract
Words (phrases or symbols) play a key role
in human life. Word (phrase or symbol) rep-
resentation is the fundamental problem for
knowledge representation and understand-
ing. A word (phrase or symbol) usually rep-
resents a name of a category. However, it is
always a challenge that how to represent a
category can make it easily understood. In
this paper, a new representation for a cat-
egory is discussed, which can be considered
a generalization of classic set. In order to
reduce representation complexity, the econ-
omy principle of category representation is
proposed. The proposed category represen-
tation provides a powerful tool for analyzing
conceptual systems, relations between words,
communication, knowledge, situations. More
specifically, the conceptual system, word rela-
tions and communication are mathematically
defined and classified such as ideal concep-
tual system, perfect communication and so
on; relation between words and sentences is
also studied, which shows that knowledge are
words. Furthermore, how conceptual systems
and words depend on situations is presented,
and how truth is defined is also discussed.
Keywords: Word, Category, Conceptual System,
Relations between Words, Sentence, Communication,
Knowledge, Situation, Truth
1 Introduction
When studying objects in the real or virtual world,
categorization is a common approach in order to com-
municate with each other. A word or phrase (some-
times, symbol) represents the corresponding category
name. Every minute in daily life, we rely on words
(phrases or symbols) to help us to deal with every-
thing, such as talking, listening, watching, thinking,
etc. Transparently, a word (phrase or symbol) usu-
ally represents a name of a category. How to repre-
sent a category becomes a pivotal question in word
understanding. In the literature, a classical category
has three representation: the corresponding name rep-
resentation, the corresponding set representation, the
corresponding proposition representation. In common
sense, a word or phrase represent the name of a cat-
egory, which is also called the concept name or the
category name. Set representation represents a class
of objects in the world belonging to the correspond-
ing category, proposition representation represents the
mental representation of the corresponding category.
Up to now, all the above three representations seem
in question. Firstly, a category usually has different
names in different languages. What’s more, a category
has different names in the same language. For exam-
ple, when seeing a specific dog, we can say it “dog” in
English, “” in Chinese. Clearly, the word “dog” is dif-
ferent from that specific dog in the world, which only
is the name of the category “dog”. Hence, the name
of a category cannot fully reflect the meaning of this
category. In extremity, the name of a category is only
considered as a symbol and has no meaning. Further-
more, sometimes man cannot find the right name of
a category for what he wants to say, and sometimes
man does not like to say the right name of a cate-
gory for what he should say. In other words, a cate-
gory may have different name in the mind from that
in the utterance. DePaulo et al. (1996) have stated
that lying was an everyday event, and Heyman et al.
(2009) have discovered that parents lie to their chil-
dren even through they maintain that lying is unac-
ceptable. Secondly, a category may be very fuzzy or
vague such as beauty, badness and so on. Clearly,
a classical set can not express this case. More sur-
prised, Watanabe and Donovan (1969) has stated that
it is impossible to distinguish a category from oth-
ers without feature selection. Thirdly, Wittgenstein
(1953) has claimed that important categories such as
games may not be defined (represented) by a proposi-
tion. Such view has been widely accepted in cognitive
science fields (Lakoff, 1987). Fourthly, it is taken for
granted that all the men should have the same repre-
sentation for a classical category. What a pity, such an
assumption is also clearly not correct, otherwise, mis-
understanding about the same category cannot occur
among men in daily life. Cognition research results
have proved that most concepts are not disembodied
but embodied (Lakoff, 1987). In the final, it is usu-
ally supposed that set representation is equivalent to
proposition representation with respect to categoriza-
tion. However, such an assumption may be false in
daily life.
Although there exist the above drawbacks, man still
can use words (phrases or symbols) to express their
thoughts, feelings and observations. Why? In this
paper, we devote to answering this question and make
major contributions as follows.
1) Semantic set is proposed to represent a category in
Section 2.
2) Conceptual system is discussed in Section 3.
3) Relations between words are studied in Section 4.
4) How to communicate concepts between people is
discussed in Section 5.
5) Relation between words and sentences is discussed
in Section 6.
6) How conceptual systems and words depend on sit-
uations is presented in Section 7.
7) The relation between semantic set and its referent
is discussed in Section 8.
8) The definitions of truth and falsity are investigated
in Section 9.
2 Category and Semantic Set
It is well known in China that The Named is the
mother of all things(Lao, 1979) and the word is used
to refer to its corresponding objects in the world
(Gongsun, 1997), which usually is limited in a spe-
cific domain. Therefore, let the discussed object do-
main be a set O and o represent an object in O,
the discussed category domain be a conceptual sys-
tem L and A denotes a category in L. For different
categories in L, o may have different representations.
For example, when categorization by obesity, a man
can be represented by his age, his weight, his height
and so on; when categorization of different types of
individuals, a man can be represented by his sensa-
tion, his intuition, his feeling,his thinking,his attitudes
and so on. Transparently, the object representation
depends on categorization. Ugly Duckling Theorem
(Watanabe and Donovan, 1969) has shown that a cat-
egory specializes its object representation, otherwise,
objects cannot be distinguished by different categories.
In this paper, when specific categorization is needed,
the corresponding object representation is supposed to
have been obtained. Therefore, let AO be the category
name we will discuss, OA = {oA|o ∈ O}, where oA is
the object representation of the object o in the set O
with respect to the category A, IA is the corresponding
membership function defined as follows.
Membership function:
IA: OA 7→ R+ is called the membership function of
A if ∀oA ∈ OA, the greater IA(oA) means the more
probability o belongs to the category A.
As OA and IA are observable, {OA, IA} is called the
outer set of A. If ∀o ∈ O, IA(oA) ∈ {0, 1}, then
it is easy to know that ∀o, IA(oA) = 1 if and only
if o belongs to the category A, and IA(oA) = 0 if
and only if o does not belong to the category A.
In this case, {OA, IA} represents a classic set. If
∀o ∈ O, IA(oA) ∈ [0, 1], then {OA, IA} represents a
fuzzy set(Zadeh, 1965).
In order to understand a category, it is reasonable to
suppose that any category should have its correspond-
ing concept in mental space (Yu, 2015). Therefore,
let A represent the concept corresponding to the cat-
egory A and the name of A be AI. When the concept
representation for any category is defined, objects can
be categorized based on the similarity between objects
and the concept representation. The category similar-
ity mapping can be defined by computing the similar-
ity between objects and the concept representation as
follows.
Category Similarity Mapping:
SimA: OA ×A 7→ R+ is called the category similarity
mapping of A if ∀o ∈ O, the increase of SimA(oA, A)
means the greater similarity between the object o and
the category A, where oA is the object representation
with respect to A.
Similarly, the category dissimilarity mapping can be
defined as follows:
Category Dissimilarity Mapping:
DsA: OA×A 7→ R+ is called the category dissimilarity
mapping of A if ∀o ∈ O, the decrease of DsA(oA, A)
means the greater similarity between the object o and
the category A, where oA is the object representation
with respect to A.
Generally speaking, (A,SimA) or (A,DsA) can be un-
observable, therefore, (A,SimA) or (A,DsA) is called
the inner set of the category A, its name is called AI.
For brevity, (AO, OA, IA) is called the outer repre-
sentation of the category A,(AI, A, SimA) is called
the inner representation of the category A. In lan-
guage, AO is the outer name of the category, A is the
mental representation of A, AI is the inner name of
of the category. Usually, AO corresponds to a word
(phrase or symbol) in a specific language, AI also cor-
responds to a word (phrase or symbol) in a specific
language. In summary, a category A can be repre-
sented by a six tuple: (AO, OA, IA,AI, A, SimA) or
(AO, OA, IA,AI, A,DsA). (AO, OA, IA,AI, A, SimA)
or (AO, OA, IA,AI, A,DsA) is called a semantic set.
Usually, a semantic set depends on its user. Hence,
a semantic set is a generalization of a classic set,
which overcomes the drawbacks of the classical cate-
gory representation and accords with the view of point
in (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).
In daily life, a category A is often represented by its
outer name AO. However, only the outer name of the
category is known, it will be a puzzle for man to under-
stand this category as the same name sometimes refers
to many categories. Many words (phrases or symbols)
in ancient classics cannot be understood by modern
man just because their corresponding outer sets and
inner sets have been lost in the long river of history.
3 Conceptual System
As Lakoff (1987) has pointed out, our conceptual sys-
tems grow out of bodily experience; moreover, the core
of our conceptual systems is directly grounded in per-
ception, body movement, and experience of a physical
and social character. Therefore, the meaning of any
word depends on a man’s physical and social environ-
ments. Transparently, different men may have differ-
ent category representations with respect to the same
category A.
Every man has at least one conceptual system, which
includes many categories. According the above analy-
sis, the man α’s conceptual system can be defined as
Lα = {Aα}, where the category Aα can be represented
by (Aα
O
, OαA, I
α
A,A
α
I
, Aα, SimαA). A
α
O
is a word (phrase
or symbol), represents the referring action with respect
to Aα, (Aα
I
, Aα, SimαA) represents the mental repre-
sentation concerned on the category Aα. If the above
three parts of the category Aα are not contradictory,
then Aα is self-consistent. How to say a category Aα
is self-consistent?
In order to answer this question, the inner referring
operator ∼ can be defined as follows:
o˜αA = argmax
Bα
I
SimαB(o
α
B , B
α) (1)
where oαA = o
α
B,B
α ∈ Lα;
The outer referring operator → can be defined as fol-
lows:
−→
oαA = argmax
Bα
O
IαB(o
α
B) (2)
where oαA = o
α
B, B
α ∈ Lα.
Sometimes,
−→
oαA or o˜
α
A is multiple value. When
−→
oαA or
o˜αA is multiple value, it is very difficult for man α to
recognize the object o.
If ∀o ∈ O(
−→
oαA and o˜
α
A are single value), it is natural to
define that AαO = {o ∈ O|
−→
oαA = A
α
O
} and AαI = {o ∈
O|o˜αA = A
α
I
}, where AαO is called the outer referring
set and AαI the inner referring set with respect to the
category Aα. If o ∈ AαO, then o can be externally called
Aα
O
, in other words, o has an outer name Aα
O
. If o ∈
AαI , then o can be internally called A
α
I
, in other words,
o has an inner name Aα
I
. In daily life, sometimes man
can call black into white. Hence it is not always true
that Aα
I
=Aα
O
for the man α with respect to one object
o ∈ O. If AαO = A
α
I and A
α
O
= Aα
I
, then Aα is self-
consistent.
Self-consistent is very helpful to reduce the complexity
of a semantic set. If a semantic set is self-consistent,
it is the simplest because its inner representation can
be ignored in some sense. Therefore, self-consistent is
the economy assumption for category representation.
However, self-consistent is not always true for a con-
ceptual system. If ∀Aα ∈ Lα such that AαO = A
α
I ,
there exist the mappings between the inner name and
the outer name as follows.
Name Encoding Mapping:
Nαe : A
α
O
7→ Aα
I
is called the name encoding mapping
of Lα, where ∀Aα ∈ Lα such that AαO = A
α
I .
Name Decoding Mapping:
Nαd : A
α
I
7→ Aα
O
is called the name decoding mapping
of Lα, where ∀Aα ∈ Lα such that AαO = A
α
I .
According to the above analysis, a conceptual system
can be accurately expressed as Lα{Nαe ,Nαd }
= {Aα} if
∀Aα ∈ Lα such that AαO = A
α
I . A conceptual system
Lα{Nαe ,Nαd }
is called a plain conceptual system. When
its name encoding mapping and its name decoding
mapping are an identity function, it can be simply
denoted by LαI , such a conceptual system is called a
self-consistent conceptual system.
For a category in the conceptual system Lα{Nαe ,Nαd }
6=
LαI , it can not be guaranteed to be self-consistent. In
this case, it is more difficult to understand the concep-
tual system Lα{Nαe ,Nαd }
than to understand the concep-
tual system LαI . In daily life, translation among dif-
ferent languages can be considered to seek the optimal
name encoding mapping and name decoding mapping.
Certainly, when the mappings between the inner name
and the outer name do not exist, the inner referring
set and the outer referring set need to be calculated in-
dependently, hence, the corresponding conceptual sys-
tem is the most difficult to be understood.
When the name encoding mapping and the name de-
coding mapping do exist for a conceptual system, it
is enough to compute either the inner referring set or
the outer referring set as the inner referring set is equal
to the outer referring set. In order to further reduce
the difficulty of understanding, it is natural to require
that the name encoding mapping and the name de-
coding mapping are an identity function, which means
such a conceptual system is self-consistent. Moreover,
if any concept can be defined by a proposition in a self-
consistent conceptual system, such a conceptual sys-
tem is called an ideal conceptual system. Certainly, an
ideal conceptual system can be accurately expressed
by natural language. If a conceptual system is not
ideal, it may not be accurately expressed by a natu-
ral language. Therefore, an ideal conceptual system is
the most easily understood and inherited. However,
it is the most difficult for man to obtain an ideal con-
ceptual system. In general, man only can continuously
approximate an ideal conceptual system through mak-
ing A be expressed by some proposition as accurately
and precisely as possible for any category A in his con-
ceptual system.
4 Relations Between Words
A conceptual system L has many words, its two words
usually have complex relations. In order to simplify
to study relations among words, two assumptions are
made as follows:
1): L is self-consistent.
2): ∀o ∈ O, ∀A ∈ L, ∀B ∈ L, oA can
be expressed by a vector with fixed length
l such as [o1A, o
2
A, · · · , o
l
A], oB can be expressed
by a vector with fixed length m such as
[o1B, o
2
B , · · · , o
m
B ],where o
i
A has a feature name A
f
i
in L, and Af = {Af1 , A
f
2 , · · · , A
f
l } is the feature set
of the category A, oiB has a feature name B
f
i in
L, and Bf = {Bf1 , B
f
2 , · · · , B
f
m} is the feature set
of the category B.
According to the above two assumptions, ∀o ∈ O,
oA can be defined as [A
f
1 (o), A
f
2 (o), · · · , A
f
l (o)], oB
can be defined as [Bf1 (o), B
f
2 (o), · · · , B
f
m(o)], where
A
f
1 (o), A
f
2 (o), · · · , A
f
l (o), B
f
1 (o), B
f
2 (o), · · · , B
f
m(o) can
be considered to be functions.
If AO=BO and AO
⋂
BO = ∅ and Af
⋂
Bf = ∅, then
the word AO and the word BO are called homonymy,
which have the same category name but with different
meanings. Theoretically, every word is homonymy as
every word can be self-referring or non self-referring.
For example, the word “dog” can refer to not only the
word “dog” itself but also a real dog in the the world.
If AO=BO and (AO
⋂
BO 6= ∅)
∨
(∃i∃j(Afi = B
f
j ))
and AO 6= BO, then the word AO and the word BO
are called polysemy.
If AO 6= BO and AO = BO, then the word AO and the
wordBO are called synonymy, which have the different
category names but with the same meaning.
If AO 6= BO and AO ⊂ BO, then the word AO and
the word BO are called hyponymy. More detailed, the
word AO is called the hyponym of the word BO, the
word BO is called the hypernym of the word AO.
If AO 6= BO and Af = Bf and AO ∩BO = ∅, then the
word AO and the word BO are called antonymy.
If AO 6= BO and ∀o ∈ AO∃o˙ ∈ BO(o ∈ o˙), then the
word AO and the word BO are called meronymy, the
word AO is called the meronym of the word BO, the
word BO is called the holonym of the word AO.
If AO 6= BO and AO ∈ BO, then the word BO is said
to modify the word AO. Usually, the word AO is called
the modified word, the wordBO is called the modifier.
Sometimes, more complex relations of two words AO
and BO are needed to be considered. For example,
metaphor and metonymy also illustrate relation be-
tween two words that seem irrelevant. In theory, if
AO 6= BO and ∃i∃j(A
f
i = B
f
j ), then one can directly
use the word AO to refer to the category B, or one
can say that AO is BO in order to make description
simple, vivid and accurate. Here, it should be pointed
out that category feature mapping usually depends on
the situation, which includes relevant people, places,
times, objects and environments.
In many applications, it is very important to com-
pute the semantic similarity between two words. Ac-
cording to the proposed category representation, cat-
egories A and B are said to be dissimilar if and only
if Af
⋂
Bf = ∅. Otherwise, the semantic similar-
ity between two words can be defined. For exam-
ple, a trivial definition of semantic similarity between
the word AO and the word BO can be defined as:
1
2 (
|Af
⋂
Bf |
|Af
⋃
Bf |
+ |AO
⋂
BO|
|AO
⋃
BO|
).
5 Communication
According the above analysis, self-consistent is very
important for category representation. However, even
when Aα is self-consistent, Aα may be something
wrong. For example, Putnam (1975) has stated that
madmen sometimes have consistent delusional sys-
tems. Why? As the final goal of a category is to help
communication, different personal conceptual systems
concerned on the category A maybe have different rep-
resentations, which results in misunderstanding, even
contradiction.
For a communication between two men α and β con-
cerned on the category A, two simple cases about the
category A are discussed as follows.
One case is that only one man knows the category A.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the man
α knows A, i.e. he knows Aα and the man β has no
idea of A, then the man β must learn the knowledge
about the category A from Aα.
In order to simplify learning, it is supposed that the
Aβ and Aα have the same outer name and all the
relevant conceptual systems are plain. Under such
assumptions, the man β needs to learn how to rep-
resent A in Lβ = {Aβ}. Hence, the above question
can be described as follows: Let the input representa-
tion be (OαA, I
α
A, A
α, SimαA) and the output represen-
tation be (OβA, I
β
A, A
β , Sim
β
A) with respect to a learn-
ing algorithm, if a subset of (OαA, I
α
A) or O
α
A is known,
try to output (OβA, I
β
A, A
β , Sim
β
A), which is a standard
categorization problem and has been well studied in
Yu and Xu (2014),Yu (2015).
The other case is that both sides in communi-
cation know the category A. Assume that the
representation of the category A for the man
α is (Aα
O
, OαA, I
α
A,A
α
I
, Aα, SimαA) and the repre-
sentation of the category A for the man β is
(Aβ
O
, O
β
A, I
β
A,A
β
I
, Aβ, Sim
β
A). In the following, we will
discuss different cases under the above assumptions.
If Aα
O
=Aβ
O
and AαO = A
β
O and A
α
I = A
β
I and A
α
I
=AI
β
and Aα = Aβ , then it is a totally perfect communica-
tion between α and β concerned on the category A. If
Aα and Aβ are self-consistent, it is easy to prove that
the number of constraints for totally perfect communi-
cation can be greatly reduced. Therefore, it takes for
granted that categories in personal conceptual systems
are self-consistent in communication. Unfortunately,
the above self-consistent conditions are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for a totally perfect communication.
If AαO = A
β
O and A
α
I = A
β
I and A
α
I
=Aβ
I
and Aα = Aβ
but Aα
O
6= Aβ
O
, then such a category at least has two
outer names when α and β make no mistake. If α or
β know that Aα
O
and Aβ
O
are two outer names of the
category A, then α and β still can understand each
other about the category A, otherwise, α and β can
not understand each other about the category A.
If Aα
O
=Aβ
O
and AαO = A
β
O and A
α
I = A
β
I and A
α
I
=Aβ
I
,
then it is a perfect communication between α and β
concerned on the category A.
If Aα
O
=Aβ
O
and AαO = A
β
O, then it is a semi perfect
communication between the man α and the man β
concerned on the category A. Compared with perfect
communication, semi perfect communication can be
easily judged. In daily life, there are few perfect com-
munications but more semi perfect communications.
Obviously, a semi perfect communication on the cat-
egory A can lead to misunderstanding in some cases.
If Aα and Aβ are self-consistent, then a semi perfect
communication becomes a perfect communication.
In practical communication, if
−→
oαA =
−→
o
β
A, then it is
a proper communication between the man α and the
man β concerned on the category A and the object
o. In everyday functioning, a proper communication
between the man α and the man β concerned on the
category A and the object o usually makes the man
α and the man β feel mutual understanding at least
with respect to the category A and the object o.
Sometimes, only Aα
O
=Aβ
O
or
−→
oαA =
−→
o
β
A is true in com-
munications. In this case, misunderstanding often oc-
curs if one side thinks communication is right. For
instance, when Aα
O
=Aβ
O
, α and β will think they can
understand each other although it is not true in many
times. For a conceptual system, a category may have
several outer names, several categories may share one
outer name, which brings more challenges into com-
munications.
Furthermore,when both sides know the category A but
only partial information is known about Aα or Aβ,
communication can still go on between the man α and
the man β. In this case, totally perfect communica-
tion is supposed to be true in order to make mutual
understanding possible. For example, Aα
O
or Aβ
O
is
illustrated, communications are still available by as-
suming that Aα = Aβ. When an object o is referred
to, communications still carry on by finding the cate-
gory corresponding to the object o by assuming that
oαA = o
β
A. Certainly, such the above cases can bring
more misunderstandings and more challenges in com-
munication as you may not see (or say) what I see (or
say)(Petrie, 1976).
Usually, perfect communication is supposed to be hold
in daily life in order to simplify mutual understand-
ing. However, communication is usually not perfect
and misunderstanding can not be guaranteed to be
avoided, which has resulted in so many errors, mir-
acles, jokes, tragedies, comedies, dramas, quarrels,
peace, wars and so on.
In general, if Lα = Lβ, then man α and man β can
perfectly understand each other. If Lα ∧Lβ 6= ∅, then
man α and man β are considered to have common
words, otherwise, they have no common word. Usu-
ally, the larger |L
α∧Lβ|
|Lα∨Lβ| , the easier man α and man β
communicate.
For human beings, education can make the outer rep-
resentation of a category to be as same as possible
for all people. If the conceptual representation of a
category is defined by a proposition, education can
make the inner representation of a category to be the
same for all people. Frankly speaking, eduction can
make men’s conceptual systems share common words
as many as possible. When men share many common
words, it can greatly reduce the dialogue cost, which is
the deep reason why man prefer to using propositions
to represent the conceptual representation of a cate-
gory. Throughout evolution, any culture has formed
enough common words so that a man can share his feel-
ing, thought, observation, instruction, plan and imagi-
nation by common words in his community, such com-
mon words can naturally form a language. A language
reflects the common words among its users.
6 Words, Sentences and Knowledge
As Wittgenstein (1953) has stated, “the meaning of a
word is its use in language”. Transparently, any word
is used in sentences. Usually, man uses not words
(phrases or symbols) but sentences to communicate
with each other. Sentences describe man’s feeling,
thought, observation, instruction, plan and imagina-
tion through the relation between words and objects
in the universe. What’s relation between words and
sentences?
When studying the relation between words and sen-
tences, a category represents sentence pattern, word
represents the sentence pattern name that a word is
used in the corresponding sentence, an object in the
discussed domain can be supposed to be a sentence.
Based on the above assumption, the proposed cate-
gory representation (AO, OA, IA,AI, A, SimA) can be
redefined as follows: ∀o, oA can be represented by a
sentence (sometimes, an object o is even a sentence.
But an object o is not guaranteed to be a sentence), AO
is an abstract name of a sentence pattern A. Conse-
quently, (AO, OA, IA,AI, A, SimA) can represent any
sentence pattern. In other words, a sentence is an
concrete object representation of some sentence pat-
tern. A sentence pattern is named by a word (phrase
or symbol).
In theory, when self-consistent holds for A, it is very
important to express A in an explicit way. According
to the above analysis, oA is an instantiations of A and
A is the conceptualization of OA. Hence, A can be
considered as an operator as follows:
A: o 7→ oA such that A(o) = oA. By this way, A can
be called category feature mapping.
Usually, A can be explicitly defined. For example, as-
suming that A is defined by a predicate PA(), then
oA = PA(o) as PA(o) is a statement. Under such
an assumption, it is easy to know that IA(oA) =
SimA(oA, A) ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, the proposed cat-
egory representation bridges the gap between words
and propositions (statements). In a broad sense, the
proposed category representation establishes the rela-
tion between sentences and words.
It is well known that knowledge can be expressed by
sentences in natural language. Considered the relation
between words and sentences, we can say that knowl-
edge are words. When you know all words clearly, you
know all knowledge as far as man can reach. Here,
a word AO refers to (AO, OA, IA,AI, A, SimA), which
belongs to common words in a culture independent of
any individual. By the above analysis, more words
means more knowledge. A new word means some new
knowledge. Eduction helps words propagate. Man
continuously creates new words to make life more ad-
vanced. To our surprise, Stefan George stated that
“where word breaks, nothing may be”, which also im-
plies that no words, no knowledge.
7 Situations
In the above analysis, a conceptual system is supposed
to be independent of situations. However, a concep-
tual system may contain too many words and the cor-
responding instantiations (sentences). Furthermore, a
man may have several conceptual systems. For exam-
ple, a man may master several languages such as En-
glish, Chinese, Spanish and so on. When will he speak
English, Chinese and Spanish? If he is in Australia,
he had better speak English. When he met a native
farmer in Australia, he had not better talk about Bei-
jing opera or Beijing roast duck. Therefore, specific
situation determines the optimal conceptual system
and words. Of course, a key problem for a man is
to determine which conceptual system should be used
at his current situation. If situations are considered as
objects and conceptual systems are considered as cate-
gories, the above problem is a standard categorization
question. In the following, mathematical language will
be used to describe relation between conceptual sys-
tems and situations.
In mathematics, suppose that S = {s(t)|t ∈ R} is the
set of situations, where s(t) is the situation at time t.
s(t) consists of all objects in the universe at time t. In
this paper, objects can be referred to any thing, includ-
ing locations, individuals, things, events,properties, re-
lations and so on.
For a man α, he only can experience his personal sit-
uations. Man α’s situations can be represented by a
set Sα = {sα(t)|t ∈ R}, where sα(t) is the situation at
time t that α is actually in. In daily life, sα(t) is very
different from s(t). In general, sα(t) ⊂ s(t). More-
over, no matter what conceptual system a man will
choose, he actually perceives the same situation at a
fixed time t. Hence, it can be assumed that sαa (t) is
the abstract situation with respect to situation sα(t),
which represents object representation that α actually
perceives at the situation sα(t). As Barwise and Perry
(1999) pointed out, all the objects in sα(t) are repre-
sented in sαa (t), but some objects represented in s
α
a (t)
do not belong to sα(t). In theory, objects represented
in sαa (t) includes objects that α has remembered, is
experiencing. Sometimes, objects represented in sαa (t)
are imagined or remembered by the man α, thus they
may not be objects in sα(t). Usually, sα(t) ⊆ sαa (t).
In practice, a man α usually has a finite conceptual
systems. Assume that Lα = {Lα(t)|t ∈ R} and
∀t,Lα(t) ∈ {Lα1 (t), L
α
2 (t), · · · , L
α
c (t)}, where L
α(t) is
the conceptual system that α adopts at time t. If a
man adopts a unsuitable conceptual system for his cur-
rent situation, embarrassments (sometimes, dangers)
may occur. Therefore, when a man α is in situation
sα(t), he needs to find the optimal conceptual sys-
tem Lα(t). In order to judge which conceptual system
should be used, it needs to set a situation feature map-
ping sL : s
α
a (t) → s
α
L(t), where s
α
L(t) is the situation
representation corresponding to the situation s(t) and
the man α.
Clearly, a conceptual system corresponds to a cate-
gory. Assuming that Lαi (t) is the concept correspond-
ing to the conceptual system Lαi (t), Sim
α
L is the cat-
egory similarity mapping between situations and con-
ceptual systems. According to the study in (Yu, 2015),
the optimal conceptual system should be defined as
Lα(t)=s˜αL(t) = argmaxLαi (t) Sim
α
L(s
α
L(t), L
α
i (t)).
When the optimal conceptual system Lα(t) is selected,
man α needs to select the optimal word for the objects
in the current situation sα(t), such issues have been
well studied in Section 3. Here, the discussed domain
is O
⋂
sαa (t) when selecting the optimal word for the
current situation sα(t).
If a man has a unique conceptual system, he can skip
the process of selecting conceptual systems when com-
municating with others. What a pity, a man usually
has more than one conceptual system except in child-
hood, even though he only speaks one language. Freud
(1927) had discovered that there are id, ego and su-
perego in a personal mental life. Such three parts gen-
erally have different (sometimes, contradictory) con-
ceptual systems. Thus, it is doomed for man to select
the optimal conceptual system to fit the specific situ-
ation.
Moreover, a situation often consists of several sub sit-
uations and a conceptual system also has several sub
conceptual systems. With respect to a special sub sit-
uation, an optimal sub conceptual system can be se-
lected according to the same principle. The hierarchi-
cal situation structure corresponds to similar hierar-
chical conceptual system structure.
More complex, s˜αL(t) may not be one element, which
shows that two and more conceptual systems are can-
didate. In this case, a candidate conceptual system
usually is randomly selected. The similar thing can
happen when selecting the optimal word by inner re-
ferring operator. Such cases inevitably brings mistakes
or errors in daily life. In theory, avoiding such cases
need more refined words, conceptual systems and sit-
uation representation.
For the same situation s(t), the man α and the man
β may have experience different situations sα(t) and
sβ(t), they also uses different conceptual systems Lα(t)
and Lβ(t). For example, the blind and the deaf can
not have the same situation experience even though
they are in the same situation. However, situation’s
constraints on conceptual systems are the same for all
men.
Situations make it is more complex for man to under-
stand each other. However, situations are powerful for
word sense disambiguation. In daily life, the meaning
of any pronoun is determined by situations. Without
situations, it is impossible to understand what a pro-
noun is referred to. Clearly, so called context is often a
part of a special situation. In some sense, man always
hope to find the truth independent of situations in
order to reducing the computational complexity. Cer-
tainly, it is an impossible mission for man. Usually,
situation limitation can be weaken in some sense, but
can never be totally ignored.
8 Denotation, Connotation and
Annotation
For communication, if the speaker is the man α and
the listener is the man β, the most important thing for
the listener β is to know that (AαI , A
α) when man α
said the outer name Aα
O
. However, (AαI , A
α) cannot be
observed explicitly no matter whether self-consistent is
true or not. Therefore, sometimes the speaker and the
listener can play a game together to fool others.
In theory, it is very important to know what an el-
ement in Aα
O
is referred to. Based on the study of
Popper (1972) and Cassirer (1944), an element in Aα
O
can belong to the physical world, the mental world,
and the symbolic world.
When the elements in AI are objects in the physical
world, AI is a denotation. When the elements in AI
are psychological states in the mental world, AI is a
connotation. Therefore, man can use words to refer
to not only objects in the real world but also mental
states such as pains, loves, dislikes, fears, hopes, beliefs
and intentions. Generally speaking, denotation needs
to rebuild its inner set in the corresponding conceptual
system as its referred object is explicit, connotation
must form its outer set in the corresponding concep-
tual system as the mental state is transparent for its
owner but implicit for other men.
When the denotations are investigated, it may be a
little easy to make an agreement by referring to the
objects in the physical world. When the connotations
are discussed, it may be very challenge to reach a con-
clusion accepted by two sides as the inner referring
cannot be objectively observed by two sides. In natu-
ral language, many words (phrases or symbols) can not
be absolutely denotation or connotation. For example,
the word “pig” can make people different feelings be-
sides its denotation. Clearly speaking, many words
have some affective character.
What’s more, words (phrases or symbols) may be nei-
ther denotation nor connotation. In daily life, men can
create new words (phrases or symbols) to express their
plans, imaginations and dreams. Before plans, imag-
ination and dreams come true, they are only words
(phrases or symbols). In reality, most plans, imagi-
nations and dreams have no chance of being fulfilled,
hence they are not real things in the world independent
of the corresponding words (phrases or symbols). Ac-
cording to Popper (1972) and Cassirer (1944), words
(phrases or symbols) belong to the symbolic world. As
Cassirer (1944) has pointed out, language, myth, art,
and religion are parts of the symbolic world. In mod-
ern times, television, film, advertisement, world wide
web and media are also parts of the symbolic world.
For a self-consistent category A, if elements in AI do
not correspond to something real in the physical world
or the mental world except for the corresponding word
(phrase or symbol) in the symbolic world, such a cat-
egory is called an annotation. Hence, an annotation
belongs to the symbolic world. When the discussed do-
main is constrained in the physical world or the men-
tal world except for the symbolic world, AI = ∅ means
that the corresponding category A may be an literary
invention but AI is an actual word (phrase or symbol)
in the symbolic world, for example, unicorn, Escher’s
pictures. If the discussed domain is in the symbolic
world, especially in languages, AI 6= ∅ for any cate-
goryA as AO can be self-referring. Generally speaking,
most objects are literary invention in a fiction but in-
deed reflect the writer’s idea, feeling and view. In the-
ory, the symbolic world not only reflects the physical
world or the mental world, but also creates something
not existed in the physical world or the mental world.
For example, Chomsky (1956) composed his famous
sentence “colorless green ideas sleep furiously”. Here,
“colorless green ideas” refers to nothing in the physical
world, but can refer to “colorless green ideas” itself in
language. In fact, “colorless green ideas” has its spe-
cific sound or its handwritten word image, “colorless
green ideas” can refer to the corresponding sound or
the corresponding handwritten word image. Any word
can be used without referring a real object in the phys-
ical world or a real psychological state in the mental
world. Frankly speaking, any language can be used
in the symbolic world by itself, without directly refer-
ring to any thing in the physical world or the mental
world. Furthermore, many languages have been used
in the world, and one language can be represented by
the other language, including itself.
If the conceptual system Lα is self-consistent, elements
in AαI are not objects in the physical world or the
mental world, the category Aα belongs to the sym-
bolic knowledge for the man α. In fact, some people
can use language loquaciously without referring to a
real event in the physical world or the mental world
such as Denyse(Pinker, 1995). When elements in AαI
are objects in the physical world or the mental world,
the man really knows the category Aα, Aα becomes
the real knowledge for the man α. Transparently, that
AαI = ∅ holds in the physical world does not mean that
A
β
I = ∅ holds in the physical world. The same word
may not have the same meaning for the different men.
9 Truth, Falsity and Uncertainty
In any conceptual system, it is very important
to define what truth or falsity is. According to
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), truth is based on under-
standing. Understanding includes “knowing yourself”
and “knowing others”. “Knowing yourself” occurs in
the same conceptual system, and “knowing others” in
two conceptual systems. In the following, we will dis-
cuss them respectively.
9.1 Knowing Yourself and Inner Truth
Knowing yourself means that a man know his concep-
tual system well. In other words, the man α know
which category he takes to be true in his conceptual
system Lα.
Unfortunately, the category in the conceptual system
Lα has more than the states of truth and falsity. More
specifically, for a category Aα in the conceptual system
Lα, if ∃o such that
−→
oαA or o˜
α
A is multiple value, then
Aα is said to be uncertain, otherwise, Aα is said to
be certain. When Aα is uncertain, it is impossible to
decide whether or not Aα is absolutely true or false.
If Aα can be said to be absolutely true or false, then
∀o ∈ O (
−→
oαA and o˜
α
A are single value).
If ∀o ∈ AO ∨ AI(
−→
oαA and o˜
α
A are single value), A
α is
said to be inner true if it is self-consistent, Aα is said
to be inner false if Aα
I
6= Aα
O
or AαI 6= A
α
O. Clearly,
inner true is equivalent to self-consistent.
If Aα is uncertain, it is possible to compute whether
or not Aα is true or false in probability. However, it
still can be judged if relation between a specific object
o and the category A is true or false. If
−→
oαA = o˜
α
A, then
the category Aα is locally self-consistent with respect
to the object o. In particular, if
−→
oαA = o˜
α
A and
−→
oαA = A
α
O
,
then it is inner true that the object o belongs to the
category Aα .
9.2 Knowing Others and Outer Truth
In daily life, a conscious man α knows that his judge-
ment about A may not be objectively true even if Aα
is inner true. Usually, a conscious man needs compare
his judgement with others. Let us consider the sim-
plest case. Man α only needs to consider the opinion
of man β with respect to A. If Aα
O
=Aβ
O
and AαO = A
β
O,
then man α thinks that Aα is outer true with respect
to man β. If Aα
O
6= Aβ
O
or AαO 6= A
β
O, then man α
thinks that Aα is outer false with respect to man β.
In practice, the above condition is still very demand-
ing for man α to judge whether or not Aα is outer true
with respect to man β. Therefore, the condition of the
outer truth needs further simplified with respect to a
category.
It is very difficult to get AαO and A
β
O in general cases,
but it is easier to consider an object in AαO or A
α
I .
When outer referring operator is supposed to be single
value, man α thinks that it is outer true with respect
to man β that the object o belongs to Aα if
−→
oαA =−→
o
β
A = A
α
O
, and α thinks that it is outer false with
respect to man β that the object o belongs to Aα if
−→
oαA = A
α
O
6=
−→
o
β
A. Certainly, it is easier to judge whether
or not
−→
oαA =
−→
o
β
A holds than A
α
O
=Aβ
O
and AαO = A
β
O.
In particular, if man β is supposed to be an oracle,
man α thinks that Aα is outer true if Aα
O
=Aβ
O
and
AαO = A
β
O. Man α thinks that it is outer true that the
object o belongs to Aα if
−→
oαA =
−→
o
β
A = A
α
O
and man α
thinks that it is outer false that the object o belongs to
Aα if
−→
oαA = A
α
O
6=
−→
o
β
A. Transparently, the inner truth is
not equivalent to the outer truth. Moreover, the inner
truth is independent of the outer truth.
9.3 Truth, Falsity, Uncertainty
Transparently, inner truth and outer truth are not
guaranteed to be true. In logic, it is always assumed
that absolute truth is independent of different concep-
tual systems. In order to achieve this aim, a natural as-
sumption is that self-consistent is self evident and man
β must be an oracle. Even when Aα is self-consistent,
Aα still depends on man α. In order to make category
representation impersonal, a simple assumption is that
α = β.
Under the above assumption, it is easy to judge
whether or not A is true. As a matter of fact, if A
is inner true, then A is true. If A is inner false, then A
is false. In common sense, if −→oA = o˜A = AO, it is said
to be true that the object o belongs to A; if −→oA 6= o˜A or
−→oA 6= AO, it is said to be false that the object o belongs
to A. Certainly, when making the above judgments,
the presupposition is made as follows: ∀o ∈ O (its ob-
ject representation oA is independent of any observer)
and ∀o ∈ (AO ∨ AI)(
−→oA and o˜A are single value).
Under the above assumptions and presuppositions, if
A is true, then it is not only inner true but also outer
true for anyone. If ∃o ∈ O((−→oA or o˜A is multiple value)
and (AO ∈
−→oA orAI ∈ o˜A)), A is uncertain. In particu-
lar, if the object o ∈ O((−→oA or o˜A is multiple value)and
(AO ∈
−→oA or AI ∈ o˜A)), then it is uncertain that the
object o belongs to the category A without specifica-
tion.
Obviously, the above assumption about truth is too
strong to be satisfied in daily life. Obviously, it is
little chance for a man to be an oracle. Therefore,
truth in daily life can not be defined independent of
different conceptual systems. In common sense, Aα is
empirically true with respect to man α and man β if
and only if Aα and Aβ are inner true and Aα is outer
true with respect to man β. Man α thinks that Aα is
empirically true with respect to man β if and only if
A
α is inner true and Aα is outer true with respect to
man β. More specifically, it is empirically true with
respect to man α and man β that the object o belongs
to the category A if and only if
−→
oαA =
−→
o
β
A = A
α
O
and
−→
oαA = o˜
α
A and
−→
o
β
A = o˜
β
A. If and only if
−→
oαA =
−→
o
β
A =
Aα
O
and
−→
oαA = o˜
α
A, man α thinks it is empirically true
with respect to man β that the object o belongs to the
category A.
In daily life, inner truth, outer truth and empirical
truth is more useful than truth. Sometimes, outer
truth, inner truth and empirical truth are confused
with truth in daily life. However, there are great differ-
ences among inner truth, outer truth, empirical truth
and truth. Sometimes, inner truth holds but outer
truth does not hold. A famous example in Russell
(1946) is that the lunatic who believes that he is a
poached egg is to be condemned solely on the ground
that he is in a minority, or rather on the ground that
the government does not agree with him. Certainly,
the category “the poached egg” is self-consistent with
respect to such an lunatic, therefore, it is inner true
with respect to such an lunatic, but it can not be ac-
cepted as outer truth by others that lunatic has the
right knowledge about “the poached egg”. Therefore,
the inner truth is not guaranteed to be the outer truth.
Similarly, outer truth does not guarantee inner truth.
The emperor’s new clothes clearly illustrated the dif-
ference between outer truth and inner truth. History
of science has illustrated many times that empirical
truth is equivalent to truth.
More specifically, when talking about connotations, in-
ner truth is more important than outer truth; when
referring to denotations, outer truth plays more im-
portant role than inner truth; when discussing anno-
tations, outer truth have the same influence as inner
truth. In everyday life, man should carefully distin-
guish when inner truth, outer truth, empirical truth
and truth holds.
10 Related Work
In this paper, we will partially survey some papers in
the literature related to communication and truth.
10.1 Grice’s Cooperative Principle
For communication, Grice (1975) presented cooper-
ative principle as follows: make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged.
Grice (1975) thought that cooperative principle can
yield four maxims, including quantity, quality, rela-
tion and manner as follows:
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as
is required (for the current purposes of the exchange);
do not make your contribution more informative than
is required.
Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false; do
not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Relation: Be relevant.
Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression; avoid am-
biguity; be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity); be or-
derly.
Transparently, the listener must understand the
speaker’s meaning in order to follow the cooperative
principle during conversation. When the accepted pur-
pose or direction of the talk exchange between man α
and man β is about the category A, if man α says Aα
O
,
man β should assume that Aα
O
=Aβ
O
and AαO = A
β
O and
AαI = A
β
I and A
α
I
=AI
β and Aα = Aβ .
Under such an assumption, maxim of quantity requires
that the man α refers to the object o with respect to
the category A, the man β should provide the informa-
tion oβA − o
α
A. For maxim of quality, its first condition
in requires categories in personal conceptual systems
are self-consistent, which means that AαO = A
α
I and
Aα
O
= Aα
I
; its second condition implies AαO 6= ∅. The
same requirements for the man β is also true. Maxim
of relation and maxim of manner do something with
not only relation between situations and conceptual
systems but also totally perfect communication condi-
tion, which require that people must choose the right
conceptual system according to the specific situation,
otherwise, maxim of relation and maxim of manner
may be violated in great probability.
As pointed out in Section 5, totally perfect communi-
cation condition does not ask for self-consistent, which
implies that cooperative principle is not fully consis-
tent with maxim of quality. In daily life, many stories
demonstrate this point. If totally perfect communica-
tion condition is satisfied, cooperative principle may be
obeyed. If totally perfect communication condition is
not satisfied, cooperative principle can not be obeyed.
Pinker (2007) has cited an example as follows: In an
episode of Seinfeld, George is asked by his date if he
would like to come up for coffee. He declines, explain-
ing that caffeine keeps him up at night. Later he slaps
his forehead and realizes, “‘Coffee’ does not mean cof-
fee! ‘Coffee’ means sex”. In this example, George and
his date clearly did not satisfy the totally perfect com-
munication condition, and George’s date also violated
the self-consistent condition.
In summary, Grice’s cooperative principle is just a
roughly description about self-consistent and the re-
lation between word and the corresponding category
feature representation, totally perfect communication
condition and the proposed relation between situation
and conceptual system offer more powerful explana-
tion for communication than Grice’s cooperative prin-
ciple.
10.2 On Truth
In the literature, many papers have devoted to defining
truth such as correspondence theory, coherence theory,
experientialist theory and so on (Lakoff and Johnson,
1980).
The most famous definition of truth is originally based
on the well known words of Aristotle (1908): “To say of
what is that it is not, or what is not that it is, is false,
while to say of what is that it is , or what is not that
it is not, is true”. Such statement has been translated
by Tarski (1956) as “ a true sentence is one which says
that the state of affairs is so and so, and the state
of affairs indeed is so and so”. Then it formulated the
classic Tarski truth definition, which can be intuitively
interpreted as “ Snow is white” is true if and only if
snow is white.
However, the well known words of Aristotle (1908)
about truth can be interpreted differently from classic
Tarski truth definition. In some sense, the proposed
definitions of inner truth, outer truth, empirical truth
and truth also follow Aristotle truth definition. There-
fore, the study of truth in this paper is also consistent
with correspondence theory.
If considering self-consistent as self understanding, and
semi perfect communication as mutual understand-
ing, then the definition of inner truth, outer truth,
empirical truth and truth are based on understand-
ing. So inner truth, outer truth, empirical truth and
truth are consistent with Lakoff and Johnson (1980),
which says that “we understand a statement of be-
ing true in a given situation when our understanding
of the statement fits our understanding of the situa-
tion closely enough for our purposes”. Therefore, the
proposed study of truth has all the characteristics of
Lakoff and Johnson (1980)’s experientialist theory of
truth, in other words, the study of truth in this pa-
per has some elements of a coherence theory and a
pragmatic theory.
11 Discussion and Conclusions
When ignoring category name, Yu (2015) has pre-
sented a category representation. However, everything
has a name, as Cassirer (1944) pointed out. In this
paper, a new approach to representing words (phrases
or symbols) is given by considering the category name.
This proposed category representation solves the draw-
backs of the classical category representation, it can be
taken as a generalization of a classic set.
Russell (1950) has stated that “some words have two
non-verbal uses, (a) as indicating objects (b) as ex-
pressing states of mind”. In this paper, such obser-
vations are extended to all categories. The proposed
category representation has three parts: one is about
linguistic (word, phrase or symbol), one is about ac-
tion (outer set), one is about idea (inner representa-
tion). According to Popper (1972) , words (phrases or
symbols) belong to the third world (symbolic world),
outer set belongs to the first world (physical world) ,
and inner representation belongs to the second world
(mental world). Hence, the category name can be cat-
egorized into denotation, connotation and annotation
with respect to a conceptual system. Denotation refers
to real object in the physical world. Connotation refers
to psychological state in the mental world. Annota-
tion corresponds to object in the symbolic world but
without referring objects in the physical world or the
mental world. Sometimes, man can turn some anno-
tation into reality. Under such an case, an annotation
becomes a denotation or connotation.
According the above analysis, the proposed category
representation establishes the relations among three
worlds Popper (1972). In daily life, every part of the
category representation can independently form one
conceptual system, i.e. say one thing, do another,
think differently from saying and doing. For instance,
men can smartly construct temporary conceptual sys-
tems to fit the local environmental requirements, such
as actors, pretenders, spies, translators, etc. Generally
speaking, man’s conceptual systems vary with times
and environments. Man continuously changes his own
conceptual systems through learning from others or
the world.
When a man has several conceptual systems, he usu-
ally selects the optimal conceptual systems and words
with respect to the specific situation. Situations de-
termine the adoption and evolution of conceptual sys-
tems. However, situations are very complex. Usually,
sα(t) is different from sαL(t). And the objects in s
α(t)
can be observed by other men in the time t, and the
objects represented in sαL(t) may be not observed by
other men in the time t but can be imagined or re-
membered by the man α.
Based on the proposed category representation, self-
consistent and perfect communication are defined.
Naturally, self-consistent is another version of cate-
gorization equivalency axiom proposed by Yu (2015)
and totally perfect communication reinterprets the
uniqueness axiom of category representation. Self-
consistent greatly reduces understanding complexity
and cognitive effort because of representational sim-
plicity. Therefore, self-consistent can be called the
economy assumption of category representation.
In this paper, every man has his own conceptual sys-
tem, which is consistent with the experientialist theory
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).
When two conceptual systems communicate, self-
consistent is the lowest cost requirement as the in-
ner representation can not be observable. When Aα
is self-consistent, the man α is said to tell his truth
(be honest) with respect to the category A, otherwise,
the man α is lying with respect to the category A.
The above analysis offers a clear explanation that pro-
hibitions again lying is basic moral rule is social life
just because lying can greatly increase understanding
complexity and social cost. However, when Aα is self-
consistent, the man α cannot be guaranteed to be ob-
jectively true with respect to the category A.
When self-consistent is false but the inner referring
set equals the outer referring set, it is worth further
investigation how to construct name decoding map-
ping and name encoding mapping in a conceptual sys-
tem. Translation is such a typical task. However,
an ordinary person usually has no mapping between
the inner name and the outer name in his conceptual
system. Obviously, when self-consistent is not true
for a category, man is considered to tell a lie. For
instance, Harari (2011) stated that most Christians
did not imitate Christ, most Buddhists failed to fol-
low Buddha, and most Confucians would have caused
Confucius a temper tantrum. Many researches have
been devoted to studying lying, such as DePaulo et al.
(1996); Heyman et al. (2009) and so on.
When self-consistent is supposed to be true for cat-
egory representation, relations between words are
mathematically defined such as homonymy, poly-
semy, synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy, metaphor and
metonymy, similarity. An interesting conclusion is
that every word has more than two meanings, which
latently supports that every man may have more than
one conceptual systems.
In practice, different conceptual systems often have
different influences, which can result in more com-
plex practical communication (Young and Fitzgerald,
2006). In this paper, all the analysis ignores that the
influence of Lα is different from that of Lβ, in other
words, all conceptual systems are considered to have
the same influence. Even under such an assumption,
only two simple cases about communications are dis-
cussed in this paper. One case is about learning. The
other case is about understanding about the same cate-
gory when two sides of communication both think that
they know such a category. The conditions for perfect
communication and relevant cases are presented. More
complex cases such as both communication sides only
know something about A need to further study. The-
oretically, all the above research results can be gener-
alized into any two agents with their own conceptual
systems. Such two agents can be any two sides, maybe
two men, two robots, one robot and one man, one man
and one book, and so on. In particular, if one side
in communication is supposed to be absolutely true,
then the other side is considered to be true or false de-
pending on whether the proper communication holds
or not. Furthermore, when one conceptual system has
superpower influence, other conceptual systems may
have been assimilated continuously or suppressed to-
tally. In addition, only word understanding in single
turn dialogue is studied in this paper, it is natural to
investigate how to understand multi-turn dialogue in
the future.
The proposed semantic set also establishes the rela-
tion between sentences and words, which clearly shows
that sentences are instantiations of the corresponding
words and words are conceptualization of the corre-
sponding sentences. Therefore, a surprising conclusion
can be made: words are all knowledge, i.e. there is no
knowledge without words. Here, words include spo-
ken words, body words, musical words, etc. When a
new word is created, some new knowledge is obtained.
When some words are obsolete, their corresponding
knowledge is also out of date. When some words are
updated, relevant knowledge is also renewed. There-
fore, words are evolved with situations, knowledge are
also evolved with situations. Words and knowledge
also follow the evolutionary principle: survival of the
fittest.
Last but not least, the proposed semantic set also
introduces new definition of truth and analyzes the
difference between inner truth, outer truth, empirical
truth and truth. In daily life, inner truth, outer truth,
empirical truth may be called truth. However, there
are a great gap between inner truth, outer truth, em-
pirical truth and truth. Different men may have differ-
ent inner truth, outer truth, empirical truth about the
same category. Strictly speaking, inner truth, outer
truth, empirical truth are constrained by specific situ-
ations, truth does not depend on specific situations in
some sense.
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